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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario:  former President Bill Clinton 
sits in a damp cell in The Hague.  He shifts uneasily on his 
mattress, hearing loud footsteps at the end of his cell block.  Two 
armed guards approach and inform him that he must proceed to 
the courtroom.  After shuffling out of his cell, the guards lock the 
former president in handcuffs and lead him to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.  Upon entering, the judge states that this hearing of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has convened to inform the 
defendant of the charge against him:  one count of aggression.  The 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/5
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Prosecutor alleges that Clinton committed the crime of aggression 
because he directed NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia without 
grounds of self-defense or authorization from the U.N. Security 
Council.1  Unfortunately for the former president, he cannot easily 
raise a humanitarian necessity defense, which might legally justify 
his campaign against ethnic cleansing, because no such defense 
currently exists in the Court’s statute. 
In 1998, the United Nations promulgated the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, declaring that the Court would have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression.2  Because the Rome Statute did not define the 
crime,3 the ICC cannot prosecute anyone for aggression until the 
Statute’s state parties agree on a definition.4  Currently, an ICC 
working group is developing a draft definition of the crime that it 
will submit to member states at their first Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute in 2010.5  One category of military force that will 
probably fall within the working group’s definition of aggression is 
humanitarian intervention lacking U.N. Security Council 
 
1 For the sake of this hypothetical, we will assume that the ICC has 
jurisdiction over NATO’s 1999 action.  In fact, it does not because the Court only 
has jurisdiction over crimes that occurred after the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which established the Court, entered into force in 
2002.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11, para. 1, opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force July 1, 
2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal 
/Rome_Statute_English.pdf. 
2 International Criminal Court [ICC], Establishment of the Court, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/establishment.html (last visited Nov. 
25, 2008); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 1, art. 5, 
paras. 1(d), 2. 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 1, art. 5, paras. 
1(d), 2.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states that “[t]he 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is 
adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out 
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
this crime.”  Id., art. 5, para 2.  It adds that “[s]uch a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”  Id. 
4 COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. [CICC], THE ICC AND THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION, (May 2008) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_Crime 
_of_Aggression_Factsheet_FINAL_eng_1May07.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
5 International Criminal Court-Assembly of States Parties [ICC-ASP], ICC-
ASP Res. 1/1 (Sept. 9, 2002).  Originally scheduled for 2009, the Conference 
probably will not occur until early 2010.  ICC-ASP, Informal-Intersessional 
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-
ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, paras. 59–65, (June 11–14, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int 
/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF.1_English.pdf. 
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approval.6  Intense debate exists over whether such interventions 
are legal,7 and if the group does not develop a defense for this type 
of action, leaders of unauthorized but legitimate humanitarian 
interventions like former President Clinton will face convictions for 
the crime of aggression at the ICC.8 
This Comment argues that the ICC should adopt a 
humanitarian necessity defense so individuals who direct 
interventions to end atrocities—the “knights of humanity”—will 
not fear aggression convictions.9  Section 2 contends that today, 
aggression is an international crime for which courts may hold 
individuals responsible.  Section 3 examines the legal history of 
humanitarian intervention and argues that although a right to 
intervene likely existed before World War II, the U.N. Charter 
outlawed the practice, except when authorized by the Security 
Council.  Despite this shift, a customary right of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is reemerging, although it has not yet 
crystallized into a clear U.N. Charter exception.  Section 4 argues 
that the ICC working group will probably recommend a definition 
of aggression that criminalizes unilateral humanitarian 
interventions.  Section 5 recommends that the working group build 
on recent customary developments to draft a definition of 
aggression that includes a necessity defense for these 
unauthorized, but arguably legitimate, incursions.  Finally, Section 
 
6 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish 
Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 558 (2007) (observing that U.S. 
and U.K. representatives at the 1998 Rome Conference worried that a broad 
definition of aggression would interfere with their countries’ ability to conduct 
unilateral humanitarian interventions); Benjamin P. Ferencz, Deterring Aggression 
by Law—A Compromise Proposal, html (Jan. 11, 2001), http://www.benferencz.org 
/arts/44 (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (suggesting a compromise proposal for a 
definition of the crime of aggression that explicitly identifies humanitarian 
intervention as an exception to the crime). 
7 See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, International Law and the Problem of Evil, 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 233–41 (2001) (noting fierce disagreement among 
scholars about the legality of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign to end Serbian 
atrocities in Kosovo). 
8 See Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The NATO Military Action and the Potential 
Impact of the International Criminal Court, 4 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 498, 527–28 
(2000) (recognizing that high-level policy makers in states that engage in 
humanitarian interventions could face prosecution for the crime of aggression at 
the ICC). 
9 See OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODHOUSE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT: A RECONCEPTUALIZATION 228–29 (1996) (arguing that 
just war concepts provide theoretical support for humanitarian intervention and 
referring to humanitarian intervenors as “knights of humanity”). 
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6 concludes that if the parties to the Rome Statute adopt a 
humanitarian necessity defense, they will enhance international 
legal protections for human rights and will reduce the likelihood 
that leaders who use military force to prevent atrocities will face 
ICC convictions. 
2. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION:  TOWARD INDIVIDUAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
To end the bloodshed of the Thirty Years War, European 
powers signed the Peace of Westphalia, a treaty that protected 
heads of state with sovereign immunity and declared states 
sovereign over their own internal affairs.10  Paradoxically, many 
leaders began to claim that a right to wage war inhered in this 
concept of sovereignty.11  In the twentieth century, the 
international community became increasingly frustrated by 
aggressors’ ability to hide behind sovereign immunity, especially 
after the slaughter of the two World Wars.12  In 1945 and 1946, the 
Allies launched the landmark International Military Tribunals 
(“IMTs”) in Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute aggressors and 
end the cycle of impunity.13  Although resting on a weak legal 
foundation, the IMTs’ prosecutions quickly gained international 
approval and initiated a decades-long process that has culminated 
in the ICC’s drafting of the crime of aggression.14  Section 2.1 will 
examine the failed attempts to criminalize aggression in the early 
 
10 Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: Involuntary Sovereignty 
Waiver—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great 
Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 372–83 (2005). 
11 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 75 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2005) (1988). 
12 See Kelly, supra note 10, at 9 (explaining that the Peace of Westphalia’s 
sovereignty package for states included immunity for heads of state or 
government); Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and Its Origins: The Lost 
Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2338–39, 
2363–66 (2002) (describing popular anti-Nazi literature in Allied countries that 
imagined prosecutions of Axis leaders for aggression and momentum within the 
U.S. government to try these leaders for crimes against peace). 
13 See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The General Principles of International Criminal 
Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 38, 38–39 
(2004) (discussing the legal effects of the IMT Charter and the additional 
provisions of crimes against peace and humanity unique to pre-existing 
occupation law). 
14 See infra notes 27–36 and accompanying text (describing IMTs’ vague 
crimes, possible violations of nullum crimen sine lege, and the international 
community’s support for the legality of the IMTs). 
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20th century, Section 2.2 will explain how the IMTs introduced a 
framework for individual liability for aggression, and Section 2.3 
will assess the international community’s subsequent efforts to 
refine the IMTs’ approach. 
2.1. Early Attempts to Criminalize Aggression 
After the devastation of the First World War, the victorious 
Allies tried and failed to hold individuals accountable for 
aggressive violations of state sovereignty.  Although the Allies 
publicly arraigned Kaiser Wilhelm II for engaging in “a supreme 
offence against the international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties,”15 their own war responsibility commission determined 
that waging aggressive war was not an international criminal 
offense.16  As a result, the Netherlands, a neutral power, refused to 
extradite him for prosecution.17  The war responsibility commission 
nevertheless suggested that world powers should develop criminal 
penalties for aggression so future aggressors would not escape 
prosecution.18 
Shortly thereafter, the world community tried and failed to 
prohibit interstate war with the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.19  The 
treaty purported to ban war between contracting parties except in 
cases of self-defense and when war was an instrument of 
international policy, in other words, directed by the League of 
Nations.20  Although some commentators claim that the treaty 
criminalized aggression for states,21 the text of the treaty made no 
 
15 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany 
art. 227 June 28, 1919, 3 Malloy 3329, 3418. 
16 Comm. on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 
AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 118 (1920). 
17 See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 98 (1982) (describing the 
tense exchange between British and Dutch authorities and the eventual agreement 
regarding the Kaiser’s internment in the Netherlands). 
18 William A. Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes 
Against Peace Became the “Supreme International Crime,” in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 17, 20 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe 
Nesi eds., 2004). 
19 Richard L. Griffiths, International Law, the Crime of Aggression and the Ius Ad 
Bellum, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 301, 304–06 (2002). 
20 DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 83–85. 
21 See id. (contending that under the Kellogg-Briand system state aggression 
was illegal).  But see James Nicholas Boeving, Note, Aggression, International Law, 
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mention of individual criminal responsibility.22  Initially, many 
considered it a success because more than sixty countries joined, 
including the world’s major powers.23  However, when the Second 
World War broke out, the worthlessness of the German, Italian, 
and Soviet signatures discredited it.24 
2.2.  The IMTs Convict Individuals of Committing “Crimes Against 
Peace” 
After the Kellogg-Briand Pact failed to prevent the carnage of 
the Second World War, the Allies established International Military 
Tribunals in Germany and Japan to try Axis leaders for “Crimes 
Against Peace.”25  The IMTs sought to deter future aggressors by 
holding individuals accountable for the “planning, preparation, 
initiation, or waging” of wars of aggression.26 
The IMTs’ jurisdiction over “Crimes Against Peace” was shaky 
due to vague terminology and potential violations of the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege.27  While each IMT’s Charter declared that 
high-level policy makers committed crimes against peace when 
they engaged in wars of aggression, neither Charter defined the 
 
and the ICC: An Argument for the Withdrawal of the Aggression from the Rome Statute, 
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 557, 563 n.35 (2005) (arguing that because international 
law treats state wrongs as delicts, for which the only penalty is damages, Kellogg-
Briand merely made aggression a delict and not a crime). 
22 Boeving, supra note 21, at 563. 
23 Bush, supra note 12, at 2334. 
24 Id. at 2336. 
25 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(a), 3 Bevans 1238, 1241 
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East Charter art. 5(a), Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, 22 [hereinafter Tokyo 
Charter]. 
26 Tokyo Charter, supra note 25, art. 5(a); Griffiths, supra note 19, at 306.  The 
Nuremberg IMT declared that “crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”  Judicial Decisions: 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 172, 221 (1947); see also GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 
176–77 (2000) (describing Justice Jackson’s view that prosecuting Axis leaders 
would end any doubt that aggression and war-time atrocities are international 
crimes rather than national rights). 
27 The principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that there be “no penalty 
without a law,” meaning that a court can only punish an individual if he has 
violated a law.  Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Communications Theory and 
World Public Order, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 730 n.6 (2007). 
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term “war of aggression.”28  Justice Jackson, the Chief U.S. 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, acknowledged this defect in his opening 
speech before the Tribunal, lamenting that, “[i]t is perhaps a 
weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define a war of 
aggression.”29 
Further, several defendants argued that the Tribunals could not 
try them for aggression because no such crime existed when they 
directed high Axis policy.30  In response, the Nuremberg IMT 
claimed that its Charter did reflect international law in 1939 
because of the widespread acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact’s 
prohibition on the use of force.31  This contention is dubious 
because the Pact did not discuss individual criminal responsibility 
and consensus does not even exist as to whether it criminalized 
aggression for states.32 
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding the Tribunals’ 
jurisdiction over “Crimes Against Peace,” the IMTs successfully 
pierced the veil of state sovereignty and convicted Axis leaders of 
engaging in aggressive warfare.33  Soon thereafter, the U.N. 
General Assembly endorsed the principle of individual 
accountability when it affirmed the Nuremberg Charter.34  Thus, 
even if the IMTs convicted defendants of engaging in aggressive 
war with an ex post facto law, thereby violating the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege,35 the U.N. affirmation, along with the actual 
 
28 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6(a); Tokyo Charter, supra note 25, 
art. 5(a). 
29 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, Opening 
Address for the United States (Nov. 25, 1945), in 1 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF 
COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY, AND 
AGGRESSION 114, 166. 
30 Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and 
Sentences, supra note 26, at 217. 
31 Id. at 217–20. 
32 Boeving, supra note 21, at 563; see generally supra note 21 (reflecting debate 
between scholars as to whether the Kellogg-Briand Pact made aggression an 
international crime or merely a delict). 
33 John J. Merriam, Comment, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 122 (2001); Judicial Decisions: International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, supra note 26, at 220–21. 
34 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the 
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
35 See Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes Against 
Peace Became the “Supreme International Crime,” supra note 18, at 29 (quoting R.V.A. 
Röling, the Dutch judge at the Tokyo IMT, who stated that “aggressive war was 
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IMT trials and governments’ recognition of their legality, has 
produced a customary legal ban on aggression for which courts 
may hold individuals accountable.36 
2.3.  International Judicial Bodies Struggle to Define the Crime of 
Aggression 
In the ensuing decades, U.N. bodies attempted to define 
aggression while Cold War gridlock prevented their efforts from 
gaining much traction.  In 1949, the General Assembly instructed 
the International Law Commission (“ILC”) to develop a code of 
crimes for a future international criminal court, which led the ILC 
to produce a draft definition of the crime of aggression in 1954.37  
Unfortunately, by the time the ILC created its definition, Cold War 
international relations had transformed “aggression” into a mere 
 
not a crime under international law at the beginning of the war”).  However, the 
“Nuremberg clause” in Article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) acknowledges nullum crimen sine lege as a human right 
but notes that exceptions may exist when individuals violate “the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations.”  International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(2), adopted Dec. 19, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by United States June 8, 1992).  This formulation has its 
share of critics.  See, e.g., Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and Its Impact on 
Germany, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 800, 813, 815 (2006) (referring to Art. 15(2) of the 
ICCPR as the “Nuremberg clause” because it enables prosecutions in violation of 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege). 
36 See Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 
25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (stating that most international lawyers 
agree that U.N. activities concerning the crime of aggression, along with the 
Nuremberg trials and governments’ conduct, have contributed to establishing 
aggression as a crime in customary international law).  Governments have 
expressed their recognition of the criminality of aggression by incorporating the 
Nuremberg offenses into their military codes (as the United States did in 1956) 
and, occasionally, into their criminal codes.  See, e.g., Bush, supra note 12, at 2389 
n.211 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 27–10, The Law of Land 
Warfare para. 498 (1956)); Andreas L. Paulus, Peace through Justice? The Future of 
the Crime of Aggression in a Time of Crisis, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 25 (2004) (citing § 80 
of the German Criminal Code, criminalizing aggression for leaders of the Federal 
Republic of Germany); Claus Kress, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 347, 348 (2004) (citing 
Article 14(c) of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute criminalizing aggressive action 
by Iraqi leaders against other Arab states). 
37 Bush, supra note 12, at 2391; Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 150, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1, available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts 
/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_3_1954.pdf. 
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political epithet, and the ILC shelved the code.38  The ILC’s chief 
contribution was its assertion that Nuremberg’s “Crimes Against 
Peace” are equivalent to the crime of aggression, a notion that has 
received broad scholarly approval.39 
The U.N. General Assembly also created a Special Committee 
in 1952 to work out a definition of state aggression.  More than 
twenty-two years later, the Committee completed its definition.40 
The General Assembly adopted the Special Committee’s 
definition in 1974 with Resolution 3314.41  This non-binding 
resolution provides a generic definition of state aggression and a 
non-exhaustive enumeration of specific acts that meet its criteria.42  
It proclaims that aggression is “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
Definition.”43  Among the acts that meet this definition are 
“invasion,” “bombardment,” and “blockade[s].”44  The resolution 
does not identify conduct by individuals that might enable courts 
to prosecute them for the state’s act of aggression.45 
As the Cold War thawed and the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court became increasingly likely, the ILC 
resumed work on its draft international criminal code and 
produced a revised definition of the crime of aggression in 1996.46  
However, critics derided this draft definition as circular because it 
asserts that an individual commits the crime of aggression if he or 
she “actively participates in or orders . . . aggression.”47  Therefore, 
 
38 See Bush, supra note 12, at 2390–91 (pointing out that by 1950, “aggression” 
had been reduced to a political allegation lobbied back and forth by Cold War 
diplomats). 
39 Boeving, supra note 21, at 565. 
40 Id. at 568–69. 
41 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, at 142, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 
Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9630 (1974) [hereinafter “Resolution 3314”]. 
42 Id. art. 3. 
43 Id. art. 1. 
44 Id. art. 3, para. (a)–(c). 
45 Boeving, supra note 21, at 569. 
46 Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, supra 
note 6, at 554, 556–57; Bush, supra note 12, at 2395. 
47 Boeving, supra note 21, at 568; Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
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it does not add clarity to the vague “Crimes Against Peace” 
concept contained in the IMT Charters.48 
When negotiators met at the 1998 Rome Conference to hammer 
out a treaty establishing a permanent international criminal court, 
they used the ILC’s 1996 draft code as a basis for discussion but 
ultimately failed to reach consensus on the crime of aggression.49  
As a result, although negotiators constructed a treaty defining 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, while 
simultaneously elucidating the conditions for the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over these crimes, the Rome Statute 
did not define aggression or provide its jurisdictional basis.50 
The earliest date that the ICC can adopt a definition for the 
crime of aggression is 2009, the year its member states initially 
designated for their first Review Conference of the Rome Statute.51  
The ICC’s Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) created the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (the “Working 
Group”) to formulate a comprehensive proposal in time for this 
conference, but the Working Group’s slow pace has pushed the 
meeting back until 2010.52 
Although the crime of aggression has had a slow and halting 
birth, even without a clear definition its position as an international 
crime is secure.  IMT trials, U.N. activities, and the conduct of 
 
para. 50, available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/English 
/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf (emphasis added). 
48 Paulus, supra note 36, at 18. 
49 Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, supra 
note 6, at 557–58. 
50 The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002 but its section concerning the 
crime of aggression, Article 5(2), merely states that the Court will have jurisdiction 
over it “once a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction.”  Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2. 
51 See id. art. 121 para. 1 (stating that the first Review Conference where state 
parties may vote on amendments to the Rome Statute may occur seven years after 
the statute entered into force). 
52 Coal. for the Int’l Crim. Ct., The ICC and the Crime of Aggression: 
Resumed Sixth Session 2008, (May 2008), http://www.iccnow.org/documents 
/CICCFS_Crime_of_Aggression_Factsheet_eng_ASP_6_resumed.pdf; ICC-
ASP/1/Res. 1, supra note 5, at 328; ICC-ASP, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, supra 
note 5, at 12–13.  Section 4 will analyze the Working Group’s current efforts to 
define the crime of aggression and will explore its potential impact on the use of 
force for humanitarian ends.  See infra notes 113–46 and accompanying text 
(arguing that the Working Group will probably recommend a definition of the 
crime of aggression that criminalizes unilateral humanitarian intervention). 
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governments have confirmed aggression’s status as a customary 
international crime for which courts may disregard sovereign 
immunity and hold individuals accountable.53  As a result, 
international lawyers generally do not debate aggression’s 
criminalization and instead dispute the details of its potential 
codification at the ICC.54  The following section will examine the 
parallel growth of another area of customary international law 
governing military force—the law of humanitarian intervention. 
3. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  A LEGAL HISTORY 
Unlike the crime of aggression, which international lawyers 
confidently regard as fixed within customary international law, the 
existence of a legal right of humanitarian intervention is doubtful.  
Theoretical arguments in favor of human rights-based military 
actions date back to the seventeenth century, with the writings of 
Grotius.55  From the nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth, 
international lawyers could make a strong case that this legal right 
of humanitarian intervention had materialized.56  However, the 
 
53 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting consensus among 
international lawyers on the existence of the crime of aggression in customary 
international law due to IMT trials, U.N. activities, and governments’ behavior). 
54 See DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 121 (declaring that “[i]t is virtually 
irrefutable that . . . international law reflects the [Nuremberg] Judgment”); cf., e.g., 
Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, the International Criminal Court, and the Crime of 
Aggression: How Exclusive Is the Security Council’s Power to Determine Aggression?, 
16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (suggesting that the ICC’s definition of 
aggression should be enumerative and exhaustive so it does not violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege); Griffiths, supra note 19, at 317–18 (contending 
that the definition of aggression should be generic rather than enumerative 
because any list that claims to be exhaustive will quickly become outdated as 
technological advances create new forms of warfare). 
55 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1161–62 (Richard Tuck 
ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) (arguing that when tyrants commit massive 
atrocities against their own subjects which the international community widely 
perceives as outrageous, other states may intervene on behalf of the victims). 
56 See FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO 
LAW AND MORALITY 225–27 (3rd ed. 2005) (concluding that a customary rule of 
humanitarian intervention existed before the adoption of the U.N. Charter); David 
J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 253, 258–59 (1992) (arguing that a right of humanitarian intervention existed 
in customary international law prior to World War II); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, 
The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current 
Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203, 235 (1974) (declaring that 
before the Charter, the existence of a customary right of intervention was not in 
doubt and only its outer limits remained unclear).  But see Louis Henkin, Kosovo 
and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824  (1999) 
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international order created by the United Nations in 1945 prohibits 
the use of force outside two narrow circumstances: self-defense 
and Security Council authorization.57  Under this regime, the 
Security Council may authorize force to achieve humanitarian 
goals, but if it fails to do so, all other uses of force are “unilateral,” 
and thus illegal.58  Nonetheless, recent events indicate that a right 
of humanitarian intervention is reemerging,59 although at present it 
has not yet gelled into customary international law.60 
3.1. Humanitarian Intervention in the pre-U.N. Charter Era 
From the nineteenth century until the U.N. Charter period, 
European powers repeatedly relied on a customary right of 
humanitarian intervention to protect Christian minorities.61  The 
 
(contending that before World War II, international law outlawed military 
intrusion into another state’s territory without its assent); Simon Chesterman, 
Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the 
Rule of Law, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 293, 297–98 (2002) (characterizing the idea that 
a legal right of humanitarian intervention existed before the Charter regime as a 
fallacy, and claiming that, more accurately, the purported right had as many 
detractors as supporters). 
57 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4., arts. 39–51.  Although the Charter does not 
expressly consider the invitation by a state of a foreign military presence as a third 
exception to its prohibition on the use of force, international lawyers widely 
regard it as such.  Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to 
Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in 
Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 387–88 (1998). 
58 Henkin, supra note 56, at 826 (defining a “unilateral” intervention as an 
action that lacks authorization from the U.N. Security Council and stating that 
such acts are unlawful under the Charter, even if led by a regional organization or 
coalition of states). 
59 See Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures 
and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 798 (1999) (arguing that because 
many states acknowledged the moral and political necessity of NATO’s 1999 
intervention in Kosovo, the psychological element needed to make humanitarian 
intervention legal under customary international law exists). 
60 For a customary rule to exist, state practice must generally conform to a 
rule out of a belief that such behavior is legally required.  SEAN D. MURPHY, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 80–81 (2006); see, e.g., Cassese, supra note 59, at 
798 (stating that even if a legal right of humanitarian intervention is forming, 
widespread state practice is not yet present); INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 15 (2001) (concluding that no 
customary legal rule permitting humanitarian intervention currently exists, 
despite recent state practice that might support such law) [hereinafter THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]. 
61 See sources cited supra note 56 (citing scholars who argue that a right of 
humanitarian intervention likely existed before the U.N. Charter’s general 
prohibition on the use of force); Ravi Mahalingam, Comment, The Compatibility of 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
654 U. Pa. J. Int’l  L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
most emblematic example occurred in 1860 to 1861, when the 
French led a multinational coalition into Lebanon to protect 
Maronite Christians from persecution.62  Many in the international 
community regarded this intervention, as well as several similar 
operations, as legal.63 
3.2. The U.N. Charter Outlaws Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
The adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945 effectively abolished 
any prior right to intervene because Article 2(4) prohibits member 
states from using force “against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”64  Exceptions do exist 
however.  In particular, Article 51 permits self-defense and Chapter 
VII enables the Security Council to authorize force.65  Although the 
drafters of the Charter could have endorsed humanitarian 
intervention as another exception to its ban on force, they chose not 
to do so.66  A potential reason for its omission is the fear that 
 
the Principle of Nonintervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA 
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 237–38 (1996) (asserting that the goal of most human 
rights-based interventions during the nineteenth century, such as the French 
action in Lebanon, was to halt the maltreatment of Christian minorities). 
62 Although the Ottoman government that controlled Lebanon negotiated a 
treaty with the European powers permitting them to enter, thus potentially 
making this situation an example of invitation rather than humanitarian 
intervention, the weak Ottoman Sultan only signed the treaty after intense 
coercion from France, Britain, and Russia.  See Merriam, supra note 33, at 119 
(noting that European powers exerted heavy pressure on the Sultan to convince 
him to sign the treaty authorizing their intervention to Lebanon). 
63 Id.; see sources cited supra note 56 (citing international law scholars who 
contend that the pre-Charter interventions were legal).  The other humanitarian 
interventions on behalf of Christian religious minorities that received widespread 
legal approval were the interventions by Britain, France, and Russia to Greece 
from 1827–30, by Russia to the Ottoman Empire in 1877–78, and by Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Serbia to Macedonia in 1903.  Merriam, supra note 33, at 119. 
64 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
65 See U.N. Charter, art. 51, ch. VII (listing the provisions in the U.N. Charter 
that acknowledge self-defense and Security Council authorization as exceptions to 
its prohibition on force); see also Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 57, at 387–88 
(noting invitation as a third exception). 
66 See Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 57, at 372–73 (noting that the Charter 
did not recognize humanitarian intervention as an exception to its prohibition on 
force, thereby terminating any prior customary right of humanitarian 
intervention).  Indeed, the U.N. drafters rejected a French proposal that would 
have allowed member states to use force “in the interest of peace, right and 
justice” if the Security Council failed to act.  Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of 
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leaders might use a humanitarian intervention exception as a 
pretext for aggression, as Hitler did in Czechoslovakia in 1938.67  
Thus, humanitarian interventions that lack Security Council 
approval, even if conducted by a broad coalition of states, qualify 
as state aggression.68 
Although the U.N. Charter recognizes the need to respect 
human rights, it subordinates human rights concerns to its goal of 
upholding state sovereignty.69  The Charter articulates its support 
for sovereignty in Article 2(7), which states that “[n]othing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.”70  A textual analysis of the Charter’s 
priorities reveals that both the Preamble and Article 1 place the 
goals of preserving international security and preventing 
aggression—two items that guarantee states’ sovereignty—before 
human rights objectives.71  Further, the Charter’s references to 
human rights are vague and much less vigorous than those 
concerning sovereignty.72  The overall effect of the Charter’s 
 
the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 
59, 87 (1999). 
67 See Barry M. Benjamin, Note, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing 
the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 120, 135 
(1992) (recalling Hitler’s dubious claim that force was necessary in Czechoslovakia 
to curtail its persecution of ethnic Germans). 
68 Indeed, Article 5 of G.A. Resolution 3314 states that “[n]o consideration of 
whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as 
a justification for aggression.”  Resolution 3314, supra note 41. 
69 INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 167–68 (2000) 
[hereinafter THE KOSOVO REPORT].  Article 1(3) of the Charter merely states that the 
United Nations seeks to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights” 
and does not state that the organization’s mission is to enforce human rights.  
U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 3. 
70 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7. 
71 Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 57, at 342; cf. U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 1 
(relating to the maintenance of security and suppression of aggression), art. 1, 
para. 3 (concerning respect for human rights). 
72 THE KOSOVO REPORT, at 167–68; cf. U.N. Charter, supra note 57, art. 1, para. 3 
(stating that the United Nations seeks to promote “respect” for human rights); id. 
art. 1, para. 1 (declaring that the first purpose of the United Nations is to 
“maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression,” i.e., to guarantee the sovereignty of 
member states); id. art. 2, para. 7 (reassuring members of their exclusive 
jurisdiction over their internal affairs with the exception of force authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII). 
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primary emphasis on sovereignty is a strong endorsement of the 
principle of non-intervention.73 
 
3.3.  Arguments that a Right of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
Exists despite the U.N. Charter 
In spite of the U.N. Charter’s ban on unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, many international lawyers contend that a customary 
right to intervene exists today.  Some argue that this right survived 
the adoption of the Charter because the document advocates for 
human rights and obligates members to support human rights 
principles.74  Proponents also suggest that because the U.N. system 
has increased the weight of individual rights in international law, 
states can no longer shelter their violations by labeling them 
internal affairs.75 
Some boosters of the right to intervene support their position 
with creative interpretations of the Charter’s text.  They argue that 
Article 2(4)’s ban on force “against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” means that if a humanitarian 
intervention does not aim to meddle with a state’s territory or 
independence, the intervention is legal.76  Further, they claim that 
an incursion designed to protect human rights would not be 
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” in light of 
other provisions in the Charter that back human rights.77 
Others argue that the U.N. Security Council’s actions have 
contributed to a new customary right of intervention.  They 
contend that the Security Council has stretched the Charter by 
determining states’ internal dilemmas to be external threats to 
 
73 Mahalingam, supra note 61, at 222 (arguing that non-intervention 
inherently accompanies the right of sovereignty). 
74 Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 171 (Richard B. Lillich 
ed., 1973); U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (requiring members to fulfill their 
obligations assumed by ratification of the Charter, of which Article 1(3), 
concerning human rights, is one). 
75 Merriam, supra note 33, at 121. 
76 Merriam, supra note 33, at 122; Benjamin, supra note 67, at 149–50. 
77 See TESÓN, supra note 56, at 191 (concluding that Article 2(4) is not a total 
ban on humanitarian interventions); but see Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the 
Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (1999) (analyzing Article 2(4)’s 
history and concluding that drafters intended the phrase “or in any manner 
inconsistent with” to tighten, rather than loosen, the Charter’s prohibition on 
force). 
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peace and security, thus interpreting Article 2(7) liberally.78  For 
instance, the U.N. Security Council made this broad assessment 
with respect to Saddam Hussein’s domestic repression of Iraqi 
Kurds in 1991.79  Further, while the Council provided explicit 
approval for humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, it did not grant the 
United States and its allies permission to use violence to establish 
no-fly zones.80  Assuming that the creation of the no-fly zones was 
therefore a unilateral effort to enforce Kurdish human rights,81 the 
international community’s general approval, or tolerance, of this 
action suggests that it may have been one of several post-1945 
examples of unauthorized interventions that have contributed to 
the customary right’s return.82 
Indeed, the state practice and opinio juris associated with these 
post-Charter interventions may have revived the right of 
humanitarian intervention.  For example, in 1971, India based its 
use of force in Eastern Pakistan on a stated desire to end human 
rights violations and several states signaled their approval by 
recognizing Bangladesh.83  Additionally, at the close of the 1970s, 
Vietnam and Tanzania overthrew murderous regimes in Cambodia 
and Uganda.84  Although both states raised questionable self-
 
78 Peter R. Baehr, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND POWER POLITICS 23, 25–
27 (Michael C. Davis et. al., eds. 2004); Mahalingam, supra note 61, at 246, 257. 
79 Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 857–58 (1999); 
see S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/Res/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (condemning Iraq’s 
repression of its civilians, which “threaten[s] international peace and security”).  
The Security Council also deemed Haiti’s local coup to be an international security 
threat.  S.C. Res. 841 119, 119 U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993) (determining 
that the Haitian crisis “threatens international peace and security”). 
80 Peter Hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal 
Reappraisal?, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 445 (2001); Krisch, supra note 66, at 77–78; S.C. 
Res. 688, supra note 79. 
81 Krisch, supra note 66, at 77–79. 
82 See id. (noting that although Russia and China, and to a lesser extent the 
Arab League, protested the no-fly zones in 1998 and 1999, objections were more 
muted in the preceding seven years); Memorandum submitted by Christopher 
Greenwood, Queen’s Counsel, to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (Nov. 
22, 1999), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect 
/cmfaff/28/0020802.htm (arguing that the no-fly zones demonstrate the legality 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention under customary international law). 
83 Mahalingam, supra note 61, at 242–43. 
84 Hilpold, supra note 80, at 444–45.  The Khmer Rouge came to power in 
1975, quickly unleashing a Maoist campaign against the bourgeoisie that killed as 
many as two million people.  As a result of a territorial dispute, Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia in 1978, overthrowing the Khmer Rouge regime.  SAMANTHA POWER, “A 
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defense claims without mentioning any human rights concerns, the 
international community’s response was often muted, suggesting 
relief that Pol Pot and Idi Amin’s tyrannical governments were 
gone.85  In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States 
(“ECOWAS”) acted without Security Council authorization to halt 
atrocities in Liberia to similar quiet approval, thus adding to the 
body of customary precedent for a modern right of humanitarian 
intervention.86 
Some supporters of this right to intervene reevaluate the 
premise that sovereignty derives from states and instead claim that 
sovereignty comes from states’ citizens.87  This Kantian notion that 
individuals are the true subjects of international law enables 
proponents of humanitarian intervention to argue that when a 
state mistreats its people and loses their consent, it forfeits its 
sovereignty.88  Thus, when states commit massive violations of 
their citizens’ rights, foreign powers may intercede on their 
behalf.89  Despite the appeal of this “moral forfeiture” argument, 
many scholars consider it inapposite for a legal inquiry given its 
lack of grounding in objective law.90 
Advocates of humanitarian intervention also argue that the 
Genocide Convention has created an erga omnes obligation for 
states to intervene militarily to prevent massive human rights 
 
PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 87–88, 117–21, 141–42 
(2003).  During his rule from 1971 to 1979, Ugandan dictator Idi Amin ordered the 
execution of as many as 500,000 of Uganda’s people and sent troops across the 
Tanzanian border in 1979, prompting Tanzania’s invasion.  Patrick Keatley, 
Obituary: Idi Amin, GUARDIAN, Aug. 18, 2003, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/aug/18/guardianobituaries. 
85 See, e.g., Keatley, supra note 84. 
86 See Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO’s Application of Armed Force 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT’L & COM. L.Q. 330, 353–54, n.112 
(2000) (noting the lack of criticism of ECOWAS’s actions in Liberia and the 
subsequent endorsement of the intervention by the Security Council with 
Resolution 788). 
87 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 866–76. 
88 See Mahalingam, supra note 61, at 235 (crediting Immanuel Kant with 
shifting emphasis to the individual in international society); Michael L. Burton, 
Note, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417, 435–36 (1996) (suggesting that unilateral 
humanitarian interventions are legal based on states’ moral forfeiture). 
89 TESÓN, supra note 56, at 16–17. 
90 Hilpold, supra note 80, at 453. 
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abuses.91  The Convention obligates states to use force to stop 
genocide, and some seek to extend this duty to other atrocities.92  
Proponents of the right to intervene have also claimed that states 
have a broad “responsibility to protect” citizens of other states 
from mass murder, rape, and starvation when their own states 
refuse to do so.93  Nonetheless, most scholars consider these 
notions to be essentially political in nature and not yet binding in 
international law.94 
Supporters of humanitarian intervention ultimately argue that, 
in spite of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on force, customary 
international law has created an exception permitting states to use 
military power to prevent atrocities.  They argue that while the 
Charter’s prohibition on force may have evolved into jus cogens 
according to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the ICJ has 
also stated that customary exceptions to this rule may arise.95  
Proponents of intervention contend that not only has such a 
departure occurred, but that this exemption is consistent with the 
 
91 Id. at 453.  The concept of erga omnes is that states have certain duties 
toward the international community as a whole.  Barcelona Traction, Light & 
Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). 
92 Hilpold, supra note 80, at 453. 
93 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 99, 99 (2007); THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 
60, at 16.  The International Commission on State Sovereignty preferred the term 
“responsibility to protect” to the notion of a “right to intervene,” claiming that the 
latter focuses too much on concerns of the intervenors rather than those of the 
victims.  Id. at 16.  However, the intervenors are the ones that the ICC will try, so 
this Comment will refer to an emerging “right to intervene.” 
94 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 60, at 13; Hilpold, supra note 80, 
at 453; Bruno Simma, Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for 
Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes?, in THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS—NEW LAW? 125, 
125–26 (Jost Delbrück ed., 1993). 
95 International laws that are jus cogens are so fundamental that states may 
not deviate from them.  Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 100, 108–09 (June 27) (stating that the Charter prohibition on force is jus 
cogens but that customary exceptions to this rule might develop); MURPHY, supra 
note 60, at 81–85.  Further, ICJ opinions are only binding on the parties in each 
particular dispute before the Court so the relevance of this decision to other 
parties and/or disputes is merely persuasive.  Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2 
=2&p3=0; LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
134–35 (4th ed. 2001). 
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U.N. system because the Charter champions human rights without 
explicitly banning humanitarian intervention.96 
3.4.  The Kosovo Crisis and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
Today 
The biggest test thus far of the alleged right of humanitarian 
intervention was NATO’s 1999 campaign to end Serbian atrocities 
in Kosovo.97  Those who claim that NATO acted legally cite 
modern precedents like India’s 1971 intervention in Eastern 
Pakistan.98  They also rely on liberal constructions of Charter law, 
especially in connection with the process that the Security Council 
used to authorize force.99  They argue that NATO did not act 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of 
Serbia and so did not breach Article 2(4) of the Charter.100  They 
also point to the Security Council’s overwhelming rejection of a 
resolution condemning NATO’s actions, and its subsequent 
ratification of the alliance’s conduct with Resolution 1244.101  In 
 
96 Benjamin, supra note 67, at 142, 149. 
97 The Kosovo Report characterized the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s actions in Kosovo as “a war (against civilians) of ethnic cleansing.”  
KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 2. 
98 Although most NATO members did not claim they were acting in 
conformity with international law, Belgium did, basing its argument in part on 
recent precedents such as India’s 1971 intervention in Eastern Pakistan, Vietnam’s 
1978 incursion into Cambodia, Tanzania’s 1979 operation in Uganda, and 
ECOWAS’s military actions in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1998.  Oral 
Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), CR 1999/15 (May 
10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (citing 
recent humanitarian interventions beginning with Eastern Pakistan as precedent); 
see also Griffiths, supra note 19, at 348 (noting that when Serbia accused NATO 
members of illegally using force against it at the ICJ, Canada, France, Italy, and 
Portugal did not provide any legal justification for their actions; and Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. claimed a right to use force based on 
humanitarian grounds without offering any legal support for their position). 
99 See Richard Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 848 (1999) (arguing that a textual analysis is insufficient to 
resolve the dissonance between the United Nations’ goals of promoting human 
rights and prohibiting unauthorized force and instead an examination of context 
is necessary). 
100 See Oral Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), CR 
1999/15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files 
/105/4515.pdf (arguing that Belgium’s actions were consistent with Article 2(4) of 
the Charter because they were “not an intervention against the territorial integrity 
or independence of the former Republic of Yugoslavia”). 
101 See Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
828, 830–31 (1999) (suggesting that the Security Council’s twelve to three vote 
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addition, proponents of NATO’s Kosovo intervention make 
normative arguments about the enhanced role of human rights in 
contemporary international law, contending that this shift has 
provided the necessary legal grounding for NATO’s actions.102 
Although legal arguments in favor of NATO’s effort to end 
massive human rights abuses are morally attractive, the Kosovo 
campaign was probably illegal because it violated the U.N. Charter 
at a time when no customary right of humanitarian intervention 
existed.  Indeed, one of the most authoritative sources on the 
Kosovo conflict, the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo,103 determined that the intervention was illegal, although it 
acknowledged the moral and political legitimacy of NATO’s 
actions.104  Other prominent international lawyers have followed 
similar lines of reasoning, contending that without grounds for 
 
against a resolution condemning NATO’s Kosovo action as well as Resolution 
1244 provide legitimacy, which translates into legality); Belarus, India, and 
Russian Federation Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use 
of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 
1999) (authorizing an international security and civil presence in Kosovo after the 
conclusion of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign). 
102 See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1683, 1723, 1740 (2000) (arguing that because the main purpose of 
the expansion of international human rights law over the past fifty years has been 
to protect individuals from fundamental rights violations, NATO’s action was not 
patently illegal); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of 
the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 15 n.29 (2000) (arguing that human rights law has attained the 
status of jus cogens, not in the sense of the Vienna Convention’s definition of the 
term, but in the sense that it has become a super-custom not requiring state 
practice to be binding). 
103 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo was an initiative 
of Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and the Swedish government.  Former 
South African president Nelson Mandela called its report, the Kosovo Report, “an 
independent assessment of conflict and intervention that can assist in advancing 
dialogue amongst all leaders, scholars, and interested parties.”  KOSOVO REPORT, 
supra note 69, at 4, 15. 
104 In its report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Commission concluded that the intervention was illegal because “it did not 
receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council” but legitimate 
because “all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention 
had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo form a long period 
of oppression under Serbian rule.”  KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 4.  Its criteria 
for a “legitimate humanitarian intervention” were “serious violations of human 
rights or international humanitarian law, a failure by the UNSC to act, multilateral 
bases for the action undertaken, only necessary and proportionate force used, and 
‘disinterestedness’ of the intervening states.”  Id. at 192–93. 
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self-defense or a Security Council resolution authorizing force, 
NATO’s operation violated international law.105 
Even if NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was illegal, it has 
contributed to the ongoing reemergence of the customary right of 
humanitarian intervention.106  NATO’s campaign provided the 
most serious boost for proponents of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention in the post-U.N. Charter era.107  Although NATO’s 
members stressed that they did not consider their conduct to have 
precedential value, inevitably Kosovo, along with its precursors 
like Eastern Pakistan, has become precedent.108  Indeed, some 
scholars deem single events like Kosovo to be capable of 
transforming customary international law.109  While sovereignty 
had consistently prevailed over human rights concerns in the past, 
NATO’s Kosovo mission may represent a shift toward granting 
these competing values equal stature in the Charter system, with 
human rights occasionally trumping sovereignty.110  Still, ardent 
debate about the legal ramifications of NATO’s effort continues.  
Thus, the customary right of humanitarian intervention has not yet 
 
105 DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 313–15; Henkin, supra note 56, at 824–26; 
Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 834, 834–36 (1999).  Among those who argue that NATO’s action was 
illegal there is some disagreement as to whether the Charter restrictions on the use 
force in Article 2(4) are jus cogens.  See, e.g., Charney at 837 (stating that the Charter 
limitations on the use of force are jus cogens); but see SELECT COMM. ON FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, Fourth Report, 1999–2000, app. 2, paras. 36–80, 96–98 (denying that the 
Charter regime governing the use of force is jus cogens). 
106 See Cassese, supra note 59, at 797–98 (arguing that the psychological 
element needed to make humanitarian intervention customary law exists but the 
necessary state practice is not present); Henkin, supra note 56, at 824, 827–28 
(acknowledging the possibility that a new customary right of unilateral, collective 
intervention may be forming, although denying that humanitarian intervention 
was legal before the Charter). 
107 William A. Schabas, The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression, in THE 
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 139–40 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. 
eds., 2004). 
108 Mahalingham, supra note 61, at 243. 
109 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents, in INTERNATIONAL 
INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 3, 3–24 (Reisman & Andrew 
R. Willard eds., 2007) (contending that customary law can develop after a single 
international incident depending on how the international community responds).  
But see Cassese, supra note 59, at 797 (denying that a single incident can cause 
customary international law to evolve in this case). 
110 Jeffrey S. Morton, The Legality of NATO’s Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999: 
Implications for the Progressive Development of International Law, 9 INT’L L. STUDENTS 
ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 101 (2002); see also Brown, supra note 102, at 1706–09 
(portraying the Charter as a living constitution capable of evolution). 
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decisively returned—although the evidence indicates that it is 
making a rapid comeback. 
4. THE ICC’S DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The ICC’s Working Group has not yet completed its 
comprehensive proposal defining the crime of aggression and 
setting out the preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction.111  While 
an in-depth discussion of the jurisdictional issue is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, the central problem is that the Working 
Group has not yet agreed on what role, if any, various 
international bodies such as the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. 
General Assembly, the ICJ, and the ICC itself should play in 
determining the existence of aggression.112  As for the definitional 
issue—the focus of this section—the Working Group’s proclivities 
suggest that it will submit a definition of the crime of aggression 
that sweeps in unauthorized, but legitimate, humanitarian 
interventions like NATO’s Kosovo operation. 
4.1.  The Elements of the Working Group’s Definition of the Crime of 
Aggression 
To define the crime of aggression, the Working Group has 
based its discussions around a definition with four main 
elements—(1) leadership, (2) individual conduct, (3) intent, and (4) 
 
111 See Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
ICC-ASP, 6th Sess., at 87–94, ICC-ASP/6/20 [hereinafter 2007 Report of the 
Working Group], http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/OR_Vol_I_Annexes 
_English.20-12-07.1438.clean.pdf (noting the Working Group’s outstanding areas 
of disagreement as of December 2007 on definitional and jurisdictional issues 
related to the crime of aggression). 
112 Id. at 91–93.  Some argue that the Security Council should have primary 
responsibility for determining aggression because Article 39 of the U.N. Charter 
states that the Council “shall determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression.”  
Stein, supra note 54, at 1–2; U.N. Charter art. 39.  Others contend that if the 
Security Council fails to make a determination, the General Assembly should step 
in based on the Uniting for Peace Resolution.  Saeid Mirzaee Yengejeh, Reflections 
on the Role of the Security Council in Determing an Act of Aggression, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 128–29 (2004); 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, U.N. Doc.A/RES/377 (Nov. 3, 1950).  
Still others claim that the ICJ has authority in this circumstance.  Buhm-Suk Baek, 
The Definition and Jurisdiction of the Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal 
Court 49–51, 53 (Cornell Law School LL.M. Papers Series, Paper No. 19, 2006). 
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state aggression.113  For the first element, leadership, consensus 
exists that the Court may only hold state leaders accountable for 
aggression.114  The Working Group broadly agrees on language 
requiring individuals to be “in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”115  
For the second element, individual conduct, widespread support 
exists for a differentiated approach that emulates the language of 
Nuremberg by stating that violators must engage in “planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution” of aggression.116  The Working 
Group has not devoted much time to discussing the third element, 
intent, presumably because Article 30 of the Rome Statute already 
requires individuals to have intent to commit the material elements 
of the Statute’s crimes;117 Articles 30(2)(a)–(b) state that individuals 
must mean “to engage in the conduct” and must “cause [the] 
consequence or [be] aware that it will occur.”118 
Defining the fourth element, a state’s act of aggression, has 
proven to be the most difficult challenge.  The first controversy 
concerns whether the definition of state aggression should be 
generic, enumerative, or a combination of both, meaning a “general 
chapeau” followed by a list of specific acts.119 
 
113  Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, Proposals for 
a Provision on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP, 2nd Sess., at 236–36, ICC-
ASP/2/10, 235–36 (Jul. 24, 2002), http://www.icccpi.int/library/about 
/officialjournal/basicdocuments/ICCASP2_EN.pdf [hereinafter 2002 
Coordinator’s Paper]; Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman, ICC-A.S.P., 
5th Sess., at 4–5 I.C.C.-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int 
/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-SWGCA-2_English.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Chairman’s 
Paper]. 
114 ICC-ASP, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression, Princeton, NJ, June 8–11, 2006, ICC-
ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1, 15, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5 
-SWGCA-INF1_English.pdf. 
115 2007 Report of the Working Group, supra note 111, at 5 n.5. 
116 Id.; cf. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6(a) (deeming those who 
engage in “planning, preparation, initiation or waging” wars of aggression to 
have committed Crimes Against Peace). 
117 See, e.g., 2007 Chairman’s Paper, supra note 113, at 4 n.6 (noting that the 
working group has not specifically discussed the elements section from the 2002 
Coordinator’s Paper, which refers to intent); Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30, 
paras. 1–2. 
118 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30, para. 2. 
119 See, e.g., ICC-ASP, supra note 114, at 5 (describing debate over whether the 
definition of the act of aggression should be generic, enumerative, or a 
combination). 
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If the definition includes an enumeration of specific acts, 
another issue is whether the list should purport to be exhaustive or 
non-exhaustive of all acts of aggression.120  Proponents of an 
exhaustive list argue that it would better fit the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, while supporters of an open-ended list claim that it 
would better capture future forms of aggression.121  A related 
question is whether the definition of aggression should explicitly 
refer to or draw from Resolution 3314, the General Assembly’s 
1974 definition of the act of aggression that includes a general 
chapeau with a non-exhaustive list of examples of state 
aggression.122 
Currently, the Working Group favors Resolution 3314 as the 
basis for its definition of state aggression because it prefers the 
Resolution’s general chapeau approach.  However, the Working 
Group does not agree on whether the list that accompanies this 
chapeau should be exhaustive or non-exhaustive, nor on whether it 
should explicitly refer to Resolution 3314 in the text of the crime of 
aggression.123 
Another difficulty related to state aggression is whether the 
drafters should create a threshold by inserting qualifying language 
that rules out minor uses of force.124  Since early 2007, the group 
has deliberated between two proposals, one which says that the act 
of aggression must “by its character, gravity and scale, constitute[] 
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,” and the 
other which requires an act “such as, in particular, a war of 
aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a 
military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or 
part thereof.”125  The Working Group broadly supports the first 
 
120 See, e.g., 2007 Report of the Working Group, supra note 111, at para. 18 
(recounting discussion of whether an enumerative list should be closed or open-
ended). 
121 See, e.g., id. at para. 20 (describing debate over the pros and cons of non-
exhaustive and exhaustive lists). 
122 See, e.g., id. at para. 15–16 (considering whether to include a specific 
reference to Resolution 3314 and whether to copy its text); Resolution 3314, supra 
note 41.  For an overview of Resolution 3314, see supra notes 40–45. 
123 2007 Report of the Working Group, supra note 111, para. 18. 
124 Id. para. 25. 
125 2007 Chairman’s Paper, supra note 113, at 3. 
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proposal but has not yet reached consensus on whether to 
withdraw the second from its consideration.126 
4.2.  The Working Group Will Probably Propose a Definition of the 
Crime of Aggression that Criminalizes Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention 
The Working Group’s current preferences suggest that it will 
probably submit a definition of the crime of aggression to the 
Review Conference of the Rome Statute that is broad enough to 
ensnare unilateral humanitarian interventions.  This conclusion 
follows from the shortcomings inherent in the group’s treatment of 
the intent and state aggression elements. 
The Working Group’s handling of the intent element implies 
that humanitarian intervenors will be liable for aggression because 
the group does not propose that the Court assess why the 
intervenor acted.127  Although Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
requires the individual to purposefully undertake the proscribed 
conduct while knowing the consequences that will result,128 the 
Working Group does not intend to create a further mens rea 
requirement to evaluate why the perpetrator engaged in that 
conduct.129  Some international lawyers argue that if such an 
analysis revealed that the intervenor sought to end atrocities rather 
than alter the balance of power between his or her state and the 
target, such actions should not permit convictions for aggression, 
even if technically illegal under the U.N. Charter.130  So far, the 
Working Group has not adopted this approach and has therefore 
failed to secure a potential mens rea defense for humanitarian 
intervenors. 
 
126 ICC-ASP, Revised Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed 
by the Chairman, 6th Sess., at 3 n.3 I.C.C.-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (May 14, 2008), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-2_English.pdf 
[hereinafter 2008 Revised Chairman’s Paper] (noting that the second proposal 
“remains on the table”). 
127 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting the Working Group’s 
lack of attention to the intent element). 
128 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30. 
129 Garth Schofield, The Empty U.S. Chair: United States Nonparticipation in the 
Negotiations on the Definition of Aggression, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 20, 23 (2007) (noting 
that the possibility of adding a mens rea requirement for the crime of aggression 
has not been seriously discussed). 
130 OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 424–27, 446 (2007). 
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As for state aggression, regardless of whether the Working 
Group adopts a definition of state aggression that contains an 
exhaustive or non-exhaustive list of specific acts that constitute 
aggression, its favored basis for the act, Resolution 3314, prohibits 
humanitarian intervention.131  Resolution 3314 states in Article 5 
that, “[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether political, 
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for 
aggression.”132  It defines aggression in Article 1 as any use of force 
in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.133  Because 
unilateral interventions are currently unlawful under Article 2(4) of 
the Charter,134 a “political” justification such as humanitarian 
necessity would not absolve leaders of criminal responsibility for 
such actions.135 
Also, while supporters of the two threshold proposals for state 
aggression seek to limit the types of military conduct under ICC 
review, neither of the suggested phrases is sufficient to shield 
humanitarian intervenors.  The apparent rationale for these 
proposals is not to prevent the Court from convicting humanitarian 
intervenors, but rather to preclude the Court from reviewing 
border skirmishes.136 
Indeed, the first threshold option refers to an act’s “gravity and 
scale,” thus suggesting that a limited humanitarian action might 
not cross it.137  However, this option obligates an analysis from the 
perspective of the international community rather than the 
 
131 Resolution 3314, supra note 41, art. 1. 
132 Id. at art. 5. 
133 See id. at art. 1 (defining aggression as “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations”); cf. U.N. Charter, supra note 57, art. 2, para. 4 (declaring that, “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”). 
134 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text (citing the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo and international lawyers who argue that 
the Kosovo humanitarian intervention was illegal under Article 2(4) of the Charter 
despite any potential moral or political legitimacy). 
135 Resolution 3314, supra note 41, art. 5. 
136 CICC, Report of the CICC Team on Aggression, at 41 (Jul. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICC_Princeton_Team_Report_2007.pdf. 
137 2007 Chairman’s Paper, supra note 113, at 3. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
668 U. Pa. J. Int’l  L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
perpetrator.138  Thus, this approach would enable the Court to 
convict an intervenor who had pure intentions based on outsiders’ 
ex post facto perceptions of the act’s gravity.139  Moreover, it would 
be difficult to show how an intervention unauthorized by the 
Security Council was not a “manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations,” given the illegal status of all such interventions in 
contemporary international law.140 
Even the second threshold option, which would trigger 
scrutiny of the intervenor’s “object,” is too weak to adequately 
protect those who use force to end atrocities.141  In addition to the 
fact that the Working Group will probably soon drop this option 
from its agenda,142 the proposal does not define the phrase “war of 
aggression,” thus leaving substantial room to convict unilateral 
humanitarian intervenors.143 
At present, the Working Group is laying the groundwork for 
the ICC to convict leaders of unauthorized humanitarian 
interventions of the crime of aggression, particularly because it 
does not propose to include a mens rea defense.144  At present, the 
Rome Statute does not offer any defenses that would explicitly 
protect humanitarian intervenors.  Although Article 31(1)(d) 
presents a quasi-necessity defense of duress that potentially applies 
to humanitarian emergencies, it is insufficient because the Statute 
considers necessity a mere subset of duress rather than its own 
 
138 See SOLERA, supra note 130, at 387–88 (arguing that assessments of an act’s 
gravity and scale are subjective and stressing that an analysis should delve into 
the mental state of the intervenor rather than the international community’s ex 
post facto determination). 
139 Id. 
140 See 2007 Chairman’s Paper, supra note 113, at 3; see also supra notes 103–05 
and accompanying text (explaining consensus that unilateral humanitarian 
interventions violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and are thus illegal). 
141 2007 Chairman’s Paper, supra note 113, at 4–5. 
142 See 2007 Report of the Working Group, supra note 111, para. 26 (noting 
that a number of the delegations have requested the deletion of the “object” 
threshold option); 2008 Revised Chairman’s Paper, supra note 126, at 3 n.3 
(suggesting that although the second threshold option is still “on the table,” it is 
less favored than the first threshold option because while the first option appears 
in the current draft text of Article 8 bis, the second option only appears in a 
footnote). 
143 See sources cited supra note 142 (failing to define “war of aggression”). 
144 See supra notes 127–43 and accompanying text (arguing that current trends 
indicate that the Working Group will submit a definition criminalizing 
unauthorized humanitarian interventions). 
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distinct defense.145  Articles 31(3) and 21 of the Statute, which 
permit judges to hear defenses contained in the general principles 
of law as derived from relevant national laws, are also insufficient 
because they do not set out an explicit necessity defense.146  To 
truly ensure that leaders like President Clinton do not face 
convictions for operations like Kosovo, the Working Group should 
recommend that the Court adopt a humanitarian necessity defense 
to the crime of aggression, as Part 5 argues. 
5. THE ICC SHOULD ADOPT A HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY 
DEFENSE TO THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
After the horrors of the last century, from the mass killings of 
Armenians in 1915 to the current slaughter in Darfur, human 
beings must intensify their efforts to prevent massive atrocities.147  
The moral imperative to end gross human rights abuses spurred 
NATO to act in Kosovo and leading authorities later affirmed the 
legitimacy of the alliance’s conduct, even if it technically violated 
international law.148  If the world community largely shares this 
perception that interventions to end atrocities are legitimate, why 
should international law be at odds with justice?149  Moreover, why 
should the International Criminal Court convict those who seek to 
end atrocities of the crime of aggression?  Indeed, the Kosovo 
 
145 Ilias Bantekas, Defences in International Criminal Law, in THE PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 107, at 274–76; Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 31(1)(d); Ian Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal 
Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 360–66 (2005). 
146 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 21, 31(3).  See also Bantekas, supra note 145, 
at 276–77 (noting that courts may in some circumstances decide to apply the 
principles of a particular legal system when taking into account the divergence of 
national legislation on necessity between common and civil law systems).  
Further, Bantekas claims that an analysis of domestic laws on necessity would not 
enable the court to develop a general rule given the variance between common 
and civil law systems on this defense.  Id. 
147 See SAMANTHA POWER, supra, note 84, at 1–16 (outlining the “race murder” 
of Armenians and the surrounding events); Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 
3496731.stm (estimating that no less than 200,000 people have died in the Darfur 
conflict in Sudan). 
148 See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 4 (noting that “the NATO military 
intervention was illegal but legitimate”). 
149 See Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith, Humanitarian Intervention and Just War, 42 
MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 283, 289–90 (1998) (faulting the international legal order 
for taking an unjust approach to humanitarian intervention). 
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Report recommended closing this gap between law and legitimacy, 
and if the ICC adopts a humanitarian necessity defense, it will 
contribute to this process.150  By acknowledging an escape route for 
unilateral humanitarian intervenors, the ICC will add to the 
growing body of customary law favoring humanitarian 
intervention, thereby enhancing human rights protections and 
supplying a more sophisticated concept of aggression.  Section 5.1 
will further develop this rationale, Section 5.2 will assess the legal 
status of necessity as a defense, and Section 5.3 will propose a 
specific humanitarian necessity defense for the ICC’s adoption. 
5.1.  The Moral and Political Rationale for a Humanitarian Necessity 
Defense 
Although legal arguments in favor of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention cannot currently overcome the U.N. Charter’s 
prohibition on force, powerful moral and political imperatives 
recommend that the ICC grant the “knights of humanity” a shield 
to defend themselves from aggression charges.151  Supporting this 
conclusion are (1) practical circumstances of U.N. Security Council 
gridlock, (2) erga omnes principles, and (3) traditional just war 
theory. 
First, humanitarian intervenors should ideally operate with 
U.N. Security Council approval.  However, when a permanent 
member of the Security Council such as Russia or China threatens 
to veto a resolution authorizing force to end atrocities—thereby 
paralyzing the body’s decision making process—unilateral 
intervention should still be available.152  U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Robert Jackson wisely stated that a constitution is not “a suicide 
pact,” meaning that when legal procedures produce absurd results, 
actors may circumvent them.153  Here, this logic suggests that states 
may use unilateral force to end grave rights abuses even though 
their actions technically violate the U.N. Charter.154 
 
150 KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 10. 
151 RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 9, at 229. 
152 See Merriam, supra note 33, at 123 (noting that “[s]upporters of 
intervention argue that the right to intervene should remain a stopgap measure to 
be used when the Security Council is deadlocked and immediate action is 
required”). 
153 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
154 W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 860–62 
(1999). 
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Second, the concept of erga omnes, which refers to states’ 
obligations to the international community as a whole, urges states 
to end atrocities even without a Security Council mandate.155  The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
concurred with this approach, arguing that members of the 
international community have a “responsibility to protect” citizens 
of other states from gross rights violations if their own 
governments refuse to do so.156 
Third, although some have claimed that after the adoption of 
the U.N. Charter there are no just or unjust wars, “only legal or 
illegal ones,” just war theory still carries significant weight in the 
international order.157  The world community’s positive moral 
evaluation of NATO’s illegal intervention provides evidence for 
this assertion.158  Although the Charter limits jus ad bellum, or 
states’ right to wage war, to situations of self-defense and Security 
Council authorization,159 classical just war theory encompasses a 
broader spectrum of force.160  Traditional just war theorists widely 
recognize the protection of the innocent as a legitimate basis for 
using force, thereby endorsing humanitarian intervention.161  This 
concept is in harmony with moral forfeiture—the idea that when a 
sovereign commits gross rights abuses against its own citizens, the 
sovereign loses their consent and triggers a right of foreign powers 
to intervene on their behalf.162 
 
155 Simma, supra note 94, at 125. 
156 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 60, at 16. 
157 Eduardo Mendieta, America and the World: A Conversation with Jürgen 
Habermas, 3 LOGOS 101, 110 (2004). 
158 See, e.g., KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 4 (affirming the legitimacy of 
NATO’s action in Kosovo); Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-
General Deepy Regrets Yugoslav Rejection of Political Settlement; U.N. Doc. 
SG/SM/6938, (Mar. 24, 1999) (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, after 
NATO’s Kosovo intervention, who said that “there are times when the use of 
force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace”). 
159 MURPHY, supra note 60, at 439–41; see also Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 
57, at 387–88 (noting that although the U.N. Charter only refers to self-defense and 
authorization by the Security Council, international law also supports invitation 
as a third legal basis for using force). 
160 See Gregory Reichberg & Henrik Syse, Humanitarian Intervention: A Case of 
Offensive Force?, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 309, 311 (2002) (noting that classical just 
war theory acknowledged “self-defense (individual or collective), protection of 
other peoples, retaking stolen goods or territory, and punishment of evildoing”). 
161 Id. at 313–14. 
162 See supra, notes 87–90 and accompanying text (describing moral forfeiture 
theory). 
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In light of humanitarian intervention’s moral righteousness, the 
ICC should provide a necessity defense so those who lead such 
actions will not fear ICC convictions for aggression.  Previously, 
the international commissions on Kosovo and State Sovereignty 
recommended that the United Nations pass resolutions in favor of 
rights-based interventions.163  Although weak states are nervous 
about such measures because they worry that strong states, like the 
United States and Russia, will use them as pretexts for 
aggression,164 the Security Council has repeatedly expressed its 
support for the burgeoning “responsibility to protect.”165 
The ICC should build on these supranational developments by 
adopting a humanitarian necessity defense for unilateral 
intervenors.  This defense would help align international law with 
legitimacy by confirming the world community’s respect for 
human rights in the Rome Statute.  It would also guard against ICC 
overreaching by constraining the Court’s ability to convict justified 
users of force.  This more nuanced approach to aggression is 
essential to ensure that the crime of aggression does not hinder the 
world’s efforts to eradicate the most dangerous and abhorrent 
human rights abuses. 
5.2.  The Status of Necessity as a Defense in National and International 
Law 
Although Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute requires that the 
crime of aggression be consistent with the U.N. Charter,166 thus 
implying that the ICC should not establish a defense for those who 
violate its prohibition on force, Articles 21(1)(b)–(c) of the Rome 
Statute also permit the Court to consider general principles of 
national law and customary international law.167  Within these two 
 
163 THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 166–76, 190–91 (describing the 
development of humanitarian based military intervention in international law); 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 60, at 74–75 (listing the Commissions 
recommendations). 
164 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 107, 107 (2006). 
165 See S.C. Res. 1674, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (declaring 
that the international community has a responsibility to “protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”); see also S.C. 
Res. 1706, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (affirming Resolution 1674 in 
the context of the Sudan conflict). 
166 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2). 
167 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 21(1)(b)–(c). 
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legal realms, necessity is well established as a defense available to 
both individuals and states. 
5.2.1. Necessity as an Individual Defense in Domestic Criminal 
Law 
Although common law and civil law systems take somewhat 
different approaches to necessity, both legal systems typically 
recognize a necessity defense.168  On the common law side, the U.S. 
legal community has generally acknowledged necessity’s existence, 
as the Model Penal Code’s inclusion of a necessity defense 
illustrates.169  Civil law systems overwhelmingly support the 
necessity defense, usually with national legislation.170 
Necessity results from situations in which an individual faces a 
choice of evils and chooses the lesser one, even though doing so 
violates the letter of the law.171  The effect of this defense is societal 
acceptance of the idea that “sometimes the greater good . . . will be 
accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal 
law.”172 
The elements of the necessity defense in the United States, a 
country that takes a relatively conservative approach to the 
defense, are (1) harm avoided; (2) harm done; (3) intention to avoid 
harm; (4) relative value of harm avoided and harm done; (5) no 
third course of action/imminence; and (6) no fault in bringing 
about the situation.173  The harm avoided includes threatened harm 
to others and need not be physical.174  The harm done can be any 
kind of harm including intentional homicide, and encompasses the 
 
168 Massimo Scaliotti, Defences Before the Int’l Crim. Ct.: Substantive Grounds for 
Excluding Crim. Responsibility, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 142–45 (2001). 
169 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  However, 
some U.S. jurisdictions do not allow a defense of necessity.  See George K. Walker, 
Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries’ Imperiled 
Indigenous Nationals, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35, 49 (2002) (observing that not all 
U.S. jurisdictions admit a necessity defense). 
170 Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 144. 
171 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 395 (2003). 
172 Id. at 395–96. 
173 Id. at 399–402; cf. Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 144–45 (noting that some 
jurisdictions such as Germany require a substantial difference between the harm 
done and the harm avoided while others, such as France, merely impel a 
“disproportion” between the two harms). 
174 LAFAVE, supra note 171, at 399. 
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damage reasonably expected to occur.175  The defendant must also 
have acted believing that he would avoid a greater harm.176  The 
defendant must not have had a third option that would have 
created less harm than the harm done, or in other words, the harm 
avoided must have been an imminent emergency.177  Finally, the 
defendant must not have contributed to the situation giving rise to 
the necessity.178 
One conceptual stumbling block that divides common and civil 
law approaches to necessity is whether to frame the defense as a 
justification or an excuse.  Civil law countries typically consider the 
defense a justification, meaning that actions that would otherwise 
be illegal are accepted by society, and thus fail to merit criminal 
liability.179  However, common law theories of the defense diverge, 
with some countries, such as the United States, considering it a 
justification, and others, like Canada, deeming it an excuse.180  The 
excuse approach proposes that even though the harm done was 
illegal, courts should forgive the actor of the wrong, often because 
of the individual’s condition.181  The chief difference between these 
two concepts is that for justification, the act was just and never 
illegal, whereas with excuse, the act was illegal, but courts will 
nevertheless permit it legally.182 
5.2.2.  Necessity as an Individual Defense in International 
Criminal Law 
In international law, judicial bodies have recognized the 
existence of a customary necessity defense for both individuals and 
states, although the law is ambiguous as to whether the 
justification or excuse conception applies.  In international criminal 
law, the Nuremberg Charter neglected to include an individual 
 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 400. 
177 Id. at 401–02. 
178 Id. at 402. 
179 See Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 144 (affirming the civil law conception of 
necessity as a justification); LAFAVE, supra note 171, at 333 (defining the term 
justification). 
180 Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 171, at 335–36 (asserting the American classification 
of necessity as a justification); Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 145 (noting the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s opinion that necessity is an excuse). 
181 LAFAVE, supra note 171, at 334. 
182 Johnstone, supra note 145, at 350–51. 
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necessity provision.183  Even so, the American Military Tribunal in 
Germany, which succeeded the Nuremberg IMT, recognized 
necessity as a defense on numerous occasions.184  For example, in 
the Krupp trial it said necessity was available “when the act 
charged was done to avoid an evil, severe and irreparable; that 
there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy 
was not disproportionate to the evil.”185 
As in domestic law, consensus does not exist among 
international criminal lawyers as to whether necessity is a 
justification or an excuse.  When the Preparatory Committee on the 
ICC’s Rome Statute initially considered the necessity defense in 
1996, it left this issue open to discussion.186  Ultimately, it decided 
to circumvent the question by collapsing necessity into duress and 
using the term “exclusion of criminal responsibility” to avoid 
protracted debates on whether each criminal defense in the Rome 
Statute was a justification or excuse.187 
5.2.3. Necessity as a Defense for States in International Law 
Just as international legal experts determined that necessity is a 
defense for individuals without deciding if it should be a 
justification or an excuse,188 so the International Law Commission 
affirmed necessity as a customary defense for states without 
settling the justification/excuse debate.189  The ILC’s necessity 
 
183 See Jescheck, supra note 13, at 47.  The Nuremberg IMT also rejected a plea 
from several high-ranking German officials accused of aggression arguing that 
they had acted in “presumed self-defense” out of “presumed necessity.”  
Nevertheless, in this case, the Court only considered necessity as a component of 
self-defense.  Because self-defense and necessity are two distinct pleas, this 
decision does not reflect an IMT rejection of necessity as its own defense.  
Nuremberg Judgment, 1 I.M.T. 172, 206–07.  See DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 246–47 
(noting how self-defense and necessity are “subjects of two separate provisions”). 
184 See, e.g., The Flick Trial, 9 U.N. War Crimes Comm’n Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals 20 (1949) (finding a factual scenario in which the defense of 
necessity was appropriate). 
185  The Krupp Trial, 10 U.N. War Crimes Comm’n Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals 147, 149 (1948).  This definition of necessity conforms to the 
modern American definition although it leaves out element (6), the no fault 
requirement. 
186 Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 151. 
187 Id. at 118. 
188 Id. at 118, 148. 
189 Int’l Law Comm., Draft Articles on Responsibility for Int’lly Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries, art. 25, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at 
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defense for states appeared in its 1980 and 2001 Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.190  The 
ICJ later affirmed the ILC’s formulation of the necessity defense 
without deciding whether it applied to NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo.191 
The elements of the ILC’s 2001 definition of necessity are:  (1) 
essential interest; (2) grave peril; (3) no alternative; (4) balancing of 
interests; (5) no violation of a peremptory norm or treaty; and (6) 
no fault of the state undertaking the intervention in bringing about 
the humanitarian crisis.192  The State must have acted to protect an 
“essential interest” from a “grave and imminent peril” with no 
other option available.193  The ILC has stated that whether an 
interest is “essential” depends on the circumstances but may 
include “preserving the very existence of the State and its 
people . . . or ensuring the safety of a civilian population,” thus 
implying that protecting another state’s citizens may be 
“essential.”194  At the same time, the ILC claimed not to address the 
question of whether unilateral humanitarian interventions are legal 
if based on necessity.195 
The “balancing of interests” element requires that the state’s act 
not seriously harm an essential interest of the state(s) to which the 
perpetrator’s obligation exists.196  In other words, the state that acts 
in violation of international law cannot “seriously impair” the 
competing essential interests of the states affected by its 
infraction.197  The balancing may take into account damage to 
 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.
pdf [hereinafter “Draft Articles”]. 
190 Report of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work and Its Thirty-Second Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 1, 26–34, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2); Draft Articles, supra note 189, art. 25 at 80. 
191 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 39–40 
(Sept. 25); Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 15 (Dec. 15). 
192 Draft Articles, supra note 189, art. 25, at 80. 
193 Id. at 80. 
194 See id. 83 (noting that states have raised the necessity defense in situations 
where its survival is at risk and in the protection of civilian populations) 
(emphasis added). 
195 Id. at 84. 
196 Id. at 83–84. 
197 Id. 
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essential interests of “the international community as a whole,”198 
thus suggesting a weighing of erga omnes considerations.199 
Further, if the alleged necessity violates a peremptory norm or 
treaty obligation with the opposing state(s), the defense cannot 
apply.200  If the perpetrator contributed to the state of necessity, the 
defense is also invalid.201  The ILC apparently wrestled with the 
question of whether or not the defense was a justification or excuse 
but did not make a decision either way.202 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ confirmed that 
necessity is a customary defense for states and approved of the 
ILC’s formulation of the plea.203  The Court affirmed that an 
“essential interest” can be broader than a state’s interest in its own 
survival, stating that Hungary’s environmental emergency was an 
essential interest.  However, the Court ultimately rejected the 
defense because other, less harmful means of averting the disaster 
were available to Hungary.204  The ICJ again upheld the existence 
of the necessity defense in its advisory opinion on the legality of 
the Israeli wall in occupied Palestine but again rejected it because 
Israel could have used less injurious means to achieve its security 
goals.205 
 
198 Id. 
199 See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally 
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 41–42 (2000) (arguing that the 
ILC should adopt a proposed provision adding consideration of the interests of 
the international community as a whole); cf. Draft Articles, supra note 189, art. 
25(1)(b), at 80 (containing the erga omnes language for which Boed had advocated). 
200 See Draft Articles, supra note 189, art. 25(2)(a) (stating that necessity may 
not be invoked if the international obligation in question excludes the possibility 
of invoking necessity). 
201 Id. art. 25(2)(b). 
202 Johnstone, supra note 145, at 353–54. 
203 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 39–40 
(Sept. 25).  The dispute in this case arose from a Soviet era treaty between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to construct a dam and hydroelectric plants along 
their shared border on the Danube River.  After the fall of communism in 1989, 
increased environmental concerns led both countries’ leaders to denounce the still 
incomplete project and in 1992, Hungary gave notice of withdrawal from the 
treaty.  Hungary and Slovakia, which now controlled the former Czechoslovakia’s 
territory along the Danube, asked the I.C.J. to decide whether Hungary could exit 
the treaty and stop work on the project.  Id. at 17–37. 
204 Id. at 44–45. 
205 This case came to the ICJ after the U.N. General Assembly requested an 
advisory opinion on the legality of the Israeli wall in occupied Palestine.  Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Req. for Advisory Op.), 2004 I.C.J. 136, 144–45.  Israel said it designed the wall to 
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With respect to NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, 
representatives of the United Kingdom and Belgium raised the 
necessity defense before the United Nations and the ICJ.  The 
United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the U.N. Security 
Council told the body that NATO’s actions were legal because 
“[e]very means short of force ha[d] been tried” and military force 
was only used out of “overwhelming humanitarian necessity.”206  
Belgium’s legal counsel formally invoked the necessity defense 
before the ICJ, arguing that a “state of necessity” preceded NATO’s 
campaign.207  Relying on the ILC’s Draft Articles, Belgium’s 
counsel came to this conclusion because a “grave and imminent 
peril” to human rights values existed and NATO responded with 
military force proportionate to the danger and less damaging than 
the prospect of allowing massive rights abuses to continue.208  The 
Court never decided the case on the merits, however, because it 
found that it did not have jurisdiction to even hear it.209 
Although some have put forth critiques of the Belgian legal 
counsel’s reasoning, these appraisals are not convincing.  One 
criticism is that the Belgian representative’s definition of necessity 
differed from that of the ILC’s Draft Articles in that it replaced the 
term “essential interest” with “values.”210  However, the ILC Draft 
Articles state that essential interests may include values.211 
 
protect its civilians from Palestinian violence.  Id. at 195.  The ICJ stated that the 
wall unduly restricted Palestinian rights to movement, work, health, and 
education as enumerated in the ICCPR; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
Id. at 191–94.  In its opinion, the ICJ affirmed Israel’s right to invoke a necessity 
defense but rejected the plea because Israel could have used an alternative route 
for its wall that would have achieved its security aims with less damage to 
Palestinian human rights.  Id. at 195. 
206  Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom 
to the United Nations, Remarks made at the U.N. SCOR 54th Sess., 3988th mtg., 
(Mar. 24, 1999) at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (1999). 
207  Oral Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), CR 
1999/15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf.  
208 Id. 
209 See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 15, 32 (Dec. 
15) (holding that the former Yugoslavia was not a U.N. member state when it filed 
its suit against NATO countries and thus was not a party to the ICJ). 
210 Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 503–04 (2004). 
211 Id. 
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Some also argue that NATO’s humanitarian intervention 
violated element (5) of the necessity defense, the requirement that 
the action not contravene a peremptory norm or treaty.  Here that 
peremptory norm is the prohibition on force, which many scholars 
consider jus cogens.212  However, the Special Rapporteur for the 
1980 Draft Articles stated that although the Charter outlawed all 
force outside of self-defense and Security Council authorization, 
only the ban on aggression was jus cogens, thus making 
humanitarian intervention illegal, but not a violation of a jus 
cogens norm.213  At present, the ILC has not renounced these 
comments and has instead expressly declined to address the 
issue.214  In light of this tacit support, or at least tolerance, for the 
former Special Rapporteur’s position, as well as the common 
classification of human rights norms as themselves jus cogens,215 
NATO’s humanitarian intervention did not clearly violate a 
peremptory norm. 
Critics also contend that necessity cannot apply because NATO 
contributed to the situation by refusing to negotiate in good faith 
with Serbia before resorting to force.216  This assertion is 
unpersuasive because the Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo found no conclusive evidence that diplomacy could 
have averted Serbia’s gross rights violations.  In fact, many who 
attended the talks believe that Serbia was using the discussions to 
stall NATO in advance of fresh assaults on the Kosovars.217 
As discussed above, the Rome Statute of the ICC does not 
contain an explicit necessity defense for humanitarian 
intervention.218  Further, the ICC’s Working Group will probably 
not recommend a definition of the crime to the Review Conference 
 
212 See Charney, supra note 105, at 837–41 (characterizing the U.N. Charter’s 
prohibition on force as jus cogens). 
213 Laursen, supra note 210, at 509–14. 
214 Id. at 513–14. 
215 Walker, supra note 169, at 104–05. 
216 See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 19, at 351 (arguing that NATO added to the 
necessity by bullying Serbia during final negotiations in Rambouillet, France and 
by supporting the Kosovar Liberation Army). 
217 KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 152, 168. 
218 See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (noting the lack of an 
explicit humanitarian necessity defense in the Rome Statute). 
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of the Rome Statute that includes this defense.219  In light of the 
tremendous support for a necessity defense in national and 
international law, as well as the overwhelming moral and political 
legitimacy of unilateral humanitarian interventions, the absence of 
this defense is both glaring and troubling.220  To ensure that 
humanitarian intervenors do not receive convictions for the crime 
of aggression, the ICC should adopt an express humanitarian 
necessity defense.  The following section expands on this 
recommendation by providing a detailed proposal for this defense 
of humanitarian necessity. 
5.3. A Humanitarian Necessity Defense for the ICC 
The ICC’s state parties should adopt a humanitarian necessity 
defense so leaders of humanitarian interventions have a shield to 
protect themselves against aggression charges.  The ICC has the 
power to adopt this defense even though it might exceed 
established customary law because defining the vague crime of 
aggression is inherently a creative process.221  In drafting its 
proposal, the Working Group should conceptualize the 
humanitarian necessity defense as a justification, because acting to 
end atrocities is morally justified.  The humanitarian necessity 
defense should only be available to leaders when they have acted 
to protect populations against the ongoing threat of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes.  While certain voices favor 
a broader right to intervene, no consensus exists that lesser rights 
violations could enable intervention.222  To assess whether a leader 
should be criminally liable for directing a state’s allegedly 
aggressive actions, the Court’s analysis should not turn on the 
“who” of intervention, but rather the “why.”  Ultimately, the 
Working Group should craft a humanitarian necessity defense to 
the crime of aggression based on the ILC’s necessity defense but 
 
219 See supra notes 127–43 and accompanying text (arguing that current trends 
indicate that the Working Group will submit a definition criminalizing 
unauthorized humanitarian interventions). 
220 See supra notes 152–65 and accompanying text (contending that situations 
of Security Council gridlock, erga omnes principles, and traditional just war theory 
make unilateral humanitarian intervention morally and politically legitimate). 
221 Schabas, supra note 18, at 21; see also Meron, supra note 36, at 8 (noting the 
argument that Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute concerning crimes against 
humanity and war crimes exceeded customary law, causing some to claim that the 
ICC can make new law). 
222 Brown, supra note 102, at 1727. 
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with an added mens rea element characteristic of the necessity 
defense in domestic law and appropriate for an evaluation of 
individual criminal responsibility. 
5.3.1.  The Working Group Should Conceptualize the 
Humanitarian Necessity Defense as a Justification 
The Working Group should deem the humanitarian necessity 
defense a justification because humanitarian interventions 
undertaken to end “conscience shocking situations,” such as 
NATO’s action in Kosovo, are consistent with classical just war 
theory and the normative paradigm of the “responsibility to 
protect.”223  Framing the defense as a justification will ensure the 
intervention’s normative justness and its ex ante legality.224  The 
Working Group should not frame the humanitarian necessity 
defense as an excuse because doing so would make the 
intervention illegal ex ante, thus potentially deterring those who 
seek to end atrocities.225 
Even though the drafters of the Rome Statute purportedly 
declined to take a side in the justification/excuse debate,226 in fact, 
the text of the Rome Statute explicitly refers to justification 
concepts by using the word “justified” three times in Article 8.227  
For instance, it classifies military necessity as a justification for war 
crimes, suggesting that “[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation 
of property” may be “justified by military necessity” if carried out 
lawfully and not wantonly.228  This textual precedent, combined 
 
223 Reichberg, supra note 160, at 317; see supra notes 152–65 and accompanying 
text (contending that situations of Security Council gridlock, erga omnes principles, 
and traditional just war theory render unilateral humanitarian intervention 
morally and politically legitimate). 
224 See Johnstone, supra note 145, at 349–52 (discussing the differences and 
implications of classifying the necessity defense as one of justification or excuse in 
domestic law). 
225 See id. at 365–66 (arguing that characterizing the defense as an excuse 
creates doubt about whether the court will absolve the illegal act, thus potentially 
deterring would-be intervenors). 
226 Scaliotti, supra note 168, at 118 (noting that the drafters of the Rome 
Statute “decided to disregard the issue”). 
227 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(a)(iv) (suggesting that military 
necessity can justify the extensive destruction and appropriation of property), 
8(2)(b)(x) (implying that doctors may mutilate a patient or subject him to medical 
experiments if justified by his medical needs and interests), 8(2)(e)(xi) (using the 
same words as Article 8(2)(b)(x)). 
228 Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iv). 
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with the unusual significance of the crime of aggression—the 
“supreme . . . crime” in the words of the Nuremberg IMT—support 
the notion that the Working Group can and should deem 
humanitarian necessity a justification.229 
5.3.2.  The Humanitarian Necessity Defense Should Only Apply to 
Unilateral Interventions to Stop Genocide, Crimes against 
Humanity, or War Crimes 
The range of situations giving rise to humanitarian necessity 
must be narrowly tailored to preserve the criminalization of 
aggression.  Specifically, it should only encompass genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes because consensus does 
not exist that states can unilaterally use force to uphold lesser 
rights.230  Although many debate the universality of human rights 
values,231 human beings must have a right to be free from 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.232  Thus, the 
Working Group should only enable states to raise the 
humanitarian necessity defense in these narrow circumstances. 
The humanitarian necessity defense should not apply to the 
unauthorized use of military force for other purposes, such as the 
installation or restoration of democracy, because the emerging 
customary right of intervention only embraces unilateral force to 
end genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.233  Any 
purported right of pro-democratic intervention is conceptually 
distinct from a right of humanitarian intervention and state 
practice and opinio juris deny the emergence of the former “right” 
even more forcefully than the latter.234  Normatively, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes also present a more 
urgent threat to human life than democracy deficits because the 
costs of inaction are far more immediate and severe.  Thus, the 
Working Group should not draft the humanitarian necessity 
 
229 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 171, 186 (1947). 
230 See Brown, supra note 102, at 1726–28 (discussing the line-drawing 
problems implicated by exclusively including serious human rights violations to 
justify humanitarian intervention and the need to prevent pretextual interventions 
motivated by baser objectives). 
231 Weisburd, supra note 7, at 263–66. 
232 Brown, supra note 102, at 1727. 
233 Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 57, at 369–72. 
234 Id. at 370–71. 
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defense to shelter those who wield force unilaterally to install or 
restore democracy.235 
By focusing on the underlying human rights violations that 
give rise to a situation of humanitarian necessity—genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes—the ICC will shift the legal 
analysis from the entity undertaking the intervention to the 
purposes behind the intervention.  Since the adoption of the U.N. 
Charter, international law has focused on “who” violated its 
prohibition on force to determine if an actor is exempt from the 
rule.236  In particular, victims of aggression can currently use force 
in self-defense and agents of the Security Council can act militarily 
to implement U.N. objectives, if authorized.237  By transferring the 
analytical emphasis from the identity of the actor to the actor’s 
reasons for using force, the Court will exclude leaders of 
humanitarian interventions from criminal liability.  Because this 
approach mirrors that of just war theorists, a greater analytical 
stress on the aims of the intervenor will more closely align 
international law with morality, at least as conceived by these 
theorists.238 
5.3.3.  The Humanitarian Necessity Defense Should Include the 
Elements of the State Necessity Defense Plus an Individual 
Intent Element 
The ICC’s humanitarian necessity defense should be available 
to state leaders charged with the crime of aggression for 
conducting human rights-based interventions.  As a starting point, 
the Working Group should recall that the Court can only convict 
individuals of the crime of aggression if both the individual and 
the state have committed the requisite acts.239  The conduct of the 
individual, as a state leader, produces the state’s aggression, but 
the state’s act is nevertheless analytically and physically distinct 
 
235 In any event, the U.N. Security Council will retain the ability to authorize 
pro-democratic interventions if necessary, as it did in Haiti in 1993.  S.C. Res. 841, 
supra note 79. 
236 Reichberg, supra note 160, at 317–18. 
237 Id. at 315, 317–18.  
238 Id. at 310, 318–20. 
239 Griffiths, supra note 19, 309–10; see sources cited supra note 113 and 
accompanying text (listing the elements of the crime of aggression, including 
individual conduct and state aggression). 
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because only the state as a collective entity can produce 
aggression.240 
Given that the crime of aggression invokes an analysis of this 
collective entity’s military actions, the necessity defense from a 
typical American jurisdiction that focuses solely on individual 
conduct and intent is insufficient.241  Instead, the Working Group 
should base its necessity plea on the state necessity defense from 
the ILC.242  The ILC approach is essential because it includes an 
element that the individual necessity plea lacks—the requirement 
that the state’s act not violate any peremptory norms or treaties.243 
While the Working Group should base its defense on the ILC’s 
formulation of necessity, the state necessity defense alone is also 
insufficient because only states, and not individuals, may invoke 
it.244  Thus, the humanitarian necessity defense will only be 
complete if the Working Group adds another element to the state 
necessity defense—that of individual motive.  The inclusion of this 
individual intent element will enable the Court to examine the 
particular leader’s reasons for resorting to military force, thereby 
evaluating the purpose of the alleged aggression and linking the 
state’s conduct to the individual.  No other elements are necessary; 
if the ICC’s Prosecutor cannot show that the individual was a 
leader who directed the state’s military operations, the Prosecutor 
will have already failed to prove that the defendant committed the 
crime of aggression. 
The elements of the Working Group’s proposed humanitarian 
necessity defense to the crime of aggression should therefore 
include (1) essential interest; (2) grave peril; (3) no alternative; (4) 
balancing of interests; (5) no violation of a peremptory norm or 
treaty; (6) no fault of the state undertaking the intervention in 
bringing about the humanitarian crisis; and (7) individual motive.  
Here, the essential interests are the protection of civilian life and 
human rights values, two aims consistent with the ILC conception 
 
240 Alberto L. Zuppi, Aggression as International Crime: Unattainable Crusade or 
Finally Conquering the Evil?, 26 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2007). 
241 See supra notes 173–78 and accompanying text (describing the 
requirements of the standard American approach to individual necessity). 
242 See supra notes 192–202 and accompanying text (explaining the elements of 
the ILC’s necessity defense for states). 
243 See Draft Articles, supra note 189, arts. 25(2)(a), 26. 
244 See id. at 31, para. 1 (stating that the Draft Articles seek to articulate “the 
basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of States”) (emphasis 
added). 
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of the term “essential interest.”245  The “grave peril” need not apply 
directly to the intervening state because the ILC text suggests that 
it may belong to the international community as a whole.246  The 
“no alternative” element means that the peril must be imminent 
and that the state must have exhausted all other options, including 
diplomacy.  The “balancing of interests” requires that the harm of 
the humanitarian intervention not seriously impair the interests of 
the target state or the international community.247  While a military 
campaign would ordinarily cause severe harm to the target state’s 
essential interests by posing a threat to its very survival, if the 
intent of the intervenor is limited to ending atrocities, the incursion 
will not impair the target’s essential interests.  For elements (5) and 
(6), which are elements of limitation that could foreclose the 
possibility of a necessity defense, the same arguments from Section 
5.2, supra, apply.248 
The final individual motive element of the necessity defense 
requires an evaluation of the leader’s purpose to ensure that he or 
she truly used state power to defuse a humanitarian emergency.  
Limiting the investigation of the defendant’s motive to whether the 
leader acted to end grave human rights abuses will prevent the 
defense from becoming too expansive and thus encompassing a 
wide range of “good” motives that could erode the criminalization 
of aggression.249 
To assess whether the leader indeed acted to prevent atrocities 
and uphold human rights, the Court should examine official 
statements from his or her government, as well as relevant 
 
245 See id. at 83 para. 14 (noting that states have raised the necessity defense in 
situations where their survival is at risk and in the protection of civilian 
populations); Laursen, supra note 210, at 503–04 (noting the ILC’s apparent 
acceptance of the idea that values can be an essential interest). 
246 See Draft Articles, supra note 189, art. 25(1)(a) (stating that necessity will 
preclude wrongfulness for breaking an international obligation if the state acts to 
“safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”); id. at 83 
para. 15 (stating that an essential interest can pertain to “the international 
community as a whole”). 
247 Id. at 83–84 paras. 17–18. 
248 See supra notes 192–202 and accompanying text (providing these elements 
within the ILC’s definition); supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text (arguing 
that humanitarian intervention based on necessity would not violate the 
prohibition on force which may be jus cogens). 
249 See Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Motive, Intention, and Morality in the Criminal 
Law, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 320 (2003) (worrying that judicial inquiry into motive 
gives rise to a slew of allegedly benign motives that could nullify criminal law if 
accepted). 
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classified information.250  An evaluation of governments’ classified 
information—and the Court’s ability to draw an inference against 
the defendant for a failure to produce it—will enable ICC judges to 
look beyond officials’ potentially mendacious public statements to 
ensure that they do not exonerate pretextual aggressors.251 
If a defendant accused of the crime of aggression can show that 
the state’s act met the first six elements of the humanitarian 
necessity defense and that he or she had the motive required by the 
seventh element, the defendant will have properly invoked the 
defense.  In this situation, the outcome should be a determination 
by the Court that the Prosecutor failed to show that the state’s act 
constituted aggression, thus failing to meet the state aggression 
element of the crime of aggression.  Although the act will still be a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and thus illegal under 
international law, this defense will shield humanitarian intervenors 
from ICC aggression convictions.  The defense will not provide 
cover for aggressors because if the defendant violated a 
peremptory norm or treaty, contributed to the necessity, or had an 
invidious motive, he or she will fail to defeat the aggression 
charge. 
This defense is valuable because it will help prevent the ICC 
from deeming humanitarian intervenors “aggressors,” thus 
squaring law with morality.  The humanitarian necessity defense 
will also enhance customary legal protections for human rights by 
inching the world ever closer toward recognition of a legal right of 
unilateral intervention to end conscience-shocking atrocities. 
 
250 See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuriaius oritur: Are We Moving towards 
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World 
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25 (1999) (implying that public statements are 
the primary means to determine states’ motives behind their interventions); W. 
Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The 
International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 291, 338 n.266 (2006) (noting that the ICC Prosecutor may request 
classified information in the course of his or her investigations); Rome Statute, 
supra note 1, art. 54(3)(e)–(f) (stating that the Prosecutor may request confidential 
information during investigations and that the Prosecutor has a concomitant duty 
to maintain the secrecy of this information); Asa W. Markel, The Future of State 
Secrets in War Crimes Prosecutions, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 412, 421–23 (2007) 
(noting that Article 93 of the Rome Statute enables the ICC to request assistance 
from state parties in terms of document production and that while a government 
may resist production by using a national security defense under Article 72, the 
ICC may draw a negative inference at trial based on the withheld documents). 
251 Markel, supra note 250, at 421–23. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In the tradition of the Nuremberg Charter, the Preamble to the 
Rome Statute declares that the International Criminal Court will 
prosecute the most serious crimes, including aggression, in order 
to end impunity for those who perpetrate them.252  It also 
proclaims the ICC’s determination to “contribute to the prevention 
of such crimes.”253  In addition, the Preamble reaffirms “the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” 
which include human rights promotion.254  The Preamble also 
specifically articulates its support for Article 2(4) of the Charter’s 
prohibition on force and tacitly acknowledges Article 2(7) by 
“[e]mphasizing” that the Statute does not authorize any state “to 
intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any 
State.”255  Although the humanitarian necessity defense to the 
crime of aggression would seem to conflict with the ICC’s goals of 
prohibiting force and protecting sovereignty, it does not undercut 
the Court’s values overall because human rights-based 
interventions contribute to ending impunity and preventing the 
world’s most monstrous crimes—the prime objectives of the ICC. 
A textual analysis of the Preamble to the Rome Statute reveals 
that the ICC prioritizes holding perpetrators accountable and 
preventing atrocities over prohibiting force and maintaining states’ 
sovereignty.  To begin with, the Statute’s drafters placed the goals 
of ending impunity and averting atrocities in the fourth and fifth 
paragraphs of the Preamble while the text does not mention the 
use of force or sovereignty until the seventh and eight 
paragraphs.256  Moreover, while the Statute opens the impunity 
and atrocities prevention paragraphs with the words “Affirming” 
and “Determined,” it merely uses the word “Emphasizing” in the 
eighth paragraph on force and sovereignty, thus suggesting that, in 
 
252 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., at 1; cf. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 
25, art. 1 (stating that the tribunal exists “for the just and prompt trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis”). 
253 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., at 1. 
254 Id.; see U.N. Charter, supra note 57, art. 1, para. 3 (stating the United 
Nations’ desire to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms); id. art. 2, para. 2 (requiring members to fulfill their 
obligations assumed by ratification of the Charter, including art. 1(3) concerning 
human rights). 
255 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., at 1. 
256 Id. 
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the eyes of the Court, punishing human rights abusers and 
deterring future violators takes precedence over upholding states’ 
sovereignty.257 
This textual dichotomy, which flips the U.N. Charter’s 
sequencing of its own objectives,258 reflects a general shift over the 
past sixty years toward a greater balance between the international 
community’s two competing values of prohibiting inter-state war 
and enforcing human rights.259  This transition began almost 
immediately after the creation of the United Nations, when the 
U.N. General Assembly affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg 
Charter in its first session.260  This affirmation declared that courts 
may hold individuals responsible for crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crimes against peace.261  True, the last offense 
reinforces the ban on inter-state war, but its emphasis on 
individual criminal liability brazenly upended the centuries-old 
concept of Westphalian sovereign immunity and was a major step 
toward retooling international law to protect human rights.  The 
growing characterization of human rights norms as jus cogens,262 
combined with the impending reemergence of the right of 
humanitarian intervention, shows that human rights law has 
nearly reached a legal status equal to that of the prohibition on  the 
use of force in the modern international legal order.263 
While the ICC’s adoption of a humanitarian necessity defense 
to the crime of aggression may limit its ability to try those who use 
 
257 Id. 
258 Cf. U.N. Charter, supra note 57, art. 1, para. 1 (relating to the maintenance 
of security and suppression of aggression), art. 1, para. 3 (concerning respect for 
human rights). 
259 See Merriam, supra note 33, at 121–23 (discussing the tension between the 
two competing goals of Article 2(4)); Morton, supra note 110, at 101 (“If the 
international community is willing to sacrifice classic principles of immunity in 
order to uphold emerging principles of human rights, sacrificing state sovereignty 
to uphold the same principles is a matter of degree and does not represent a 
fundamental shift in legal thinking.”). 
260 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the 
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95/1, supra note 34. 
261 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6(a)–(c). 
262 See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 102, at 15 n.29 (arguing that human rights 
law has attained the status of jus cogens, not in the sense of the Vienna 
Convention’s definition of the term but in that it has become a “super-custom” not 
requiring state practice to be binding); Walker, supra note 169, at 104–05 
(suggesting that human rights and humanitarian law have gained jus cogens 
status). 
263 Morton, supra note 110, at 101. 
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force illegally, by permitting this defense, the Court will refine its 
approach to the crime.  Many international lawyers and state 
leaders recognize that while humanitarian interventions lacking 
Security Council approval may be technically illegal, they are just, 
and the world should not condemn them as aggression.  Even 
among those critics of NATO’s Kosovo campaign who castigated 
the alliance’s intervention as illegal, few called the operation 
“aggression.”264  To reconcile this break between law and morality, 
the ICC should adopt the humanitarian necessity defense to 
reinforce the idea that humanitarian interventions, even when 
unilateral, can be distinct from aggression. 
In so doing, the Court will ensure that the “knights of 
humanity” have a shield against aggression charges.265  Instead of 
deterring such potential humanitarian intervenors, this defense 
will help the ICC achieve its goal of “contribut[ing] to the 
prevention” of atrocities—brutal acts that it calls “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community.”266  By adopting 
the humanitarian necessity defense, the International Criminal 
Court will reject the idea that international law should be limited to 
fashioning a negative peace, defined by a lack of inter-state 
conflict, and instead forge a positive peace, in which justice 
triumphs over sovereignty.267 
 
264 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 313–15 (concluding that NATO 
violated the law without calling its conduct aggression); Charney, supra note 105, 
at 834–35 (labeling NATO’s intervention illegal without using the word 
aggression); KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 69, at 4, 70 (calling NATO’s actions 
“illegal but legitimate” without labeling them as aggression and instead 
characterizing Serbia’s actions against Kosovo as “aggression”).  But see, e.g., 
Griffiths, supra note 19, at 348 (suggesting that NATO committed an act of 
aggression “albeit possibly for very good reasons”). 
265 RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 9, at 4–7, 215 (describing 
justifications for Tanzania’s 1979 military intervention to end the brutal rule of 
Ugandan President Idi Amin). 
266 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., at 1. 
267 See Cassese, supra note 250, at 26–27 (distinguishing positive peace from 
negative peace by arguing that the former is based on justice while the latter is 
grounded in state sovereignty). 
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